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Open Source Software and Economic Growth: 
A Classical Division of Labor Perspective 
Abstract 
The article turns to classical economic insights on the division of labor and to 
institutional reasoning to identify some costs and benefits of Open Source Software 
(OSS) and proprietary software production. It suggests that, thanks to its licenses, 
OSS favors market expansion more than proprietary software does by tapping into 
spontaneous work input. The spontaneous tapping leads to a division of labor that 
exhibits what the article calls redundant economies. By generating a circle of 
knowledge growth, reuse, and sharing, redundant economies lead to increasing 
returns, which are crucial for economic growth. (92 words.) 
JEL Codes 
D20, L17, L23, O33, O34 
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1. Introduction 
This article argues that just as computer technology can be an engine of economic 
growth so too can software.1 The primary software it considers is not proprietary 
(e.g., Adobe, Microsoft), but Open Source (e.g., Apache, Linux).2 The distilled essence 
of Open Source Software (OSS) is that it is a form of collaborative, volunteer software 
production that relies on shared code and open standards. Though basically present 
since the birth of the computer, the Internet has allowed OSS production to become 
more diffused thanks to the ability to upload and download information (including 
entire programs) and to communicate in real time.3
To make our argument we rely on classical economic insights. We offer some 
stylized facts about why OSS seems more promising than proprietary software for 
economic growth from a Smithian division of labor perspective (Smith [1776]1981). 
We attempt to do so by not forgetting the complement of Smithian division of labor 
theory, namely, the extent of the market. We basically agree with Young ([1929]1990, 
p. 161) that the 
vast and intricate system of economic organization, by means of which 
the varied needs of modern life are met, is mostly a product of a 
continuous process of evolution. In only a very small part is it a result 
of conscious collective planning or devising. It grows and changes 
unceasingly … . Every innovation, whether in the technique of 
production or in … organization … affects in some degree the 
conditions which govern the activities of other producers. The 
economic system grows and evolves, like a living organism, by means 
                                                 
1 By economic growth we have in mind growth in real output per capita, also known as intensive growth. 
2 The $100 Laptop prototype unveiled at the Summit on the Information Society in Tunis in November 2005 
runs, incidentally, on Linux. 
3 See, inter alia, Raymond (2001), Benkler (2002), Lerner and Tirole (2002), Lakhani and von Hippel (2003), 
UNCTAD (2003, Ch. 4), Dalle and David (2004), and Garzarelli (2004). 
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of successive adjustments and adaptations. But change breeds change, 
and every new adjustment paves the way for another. 
Or, in more fitting terms, we suggest that OSS is more promising because it 
favors market expansion more than proprietary software does. It is able to do so 
because OSS licenses enable tapping into spontaneous work input. In light of the 
porosity (‘openness’) of OSS organization of work – and, more generally, of the OSS 
community – such tapping generates a circle of knowledge growth and sharing that 
moves beyond the narrow confines of any unique software project. In other words, 
we essentially claim that the net value of the knowledge spillovers emanating from 
the OSS production mode is positive; and in order to make such claim we attempt to 
identify what is unique about OSS division of labor. 
As elaborated in the next section, the backdrop of our story is institutional. 
That is, our division of labor story rests on the assumption that the rules of the game 
are not a matter of indifference: we stress that it is the nature of OSS licenses that 
enables an open division of labor where the benefits of redundant task matching 
outweigh the costs. We try to make our case by looking into the costs and benefits of 
proprietary and OSS organization of production. This is in line with our institutional 
backdrop. Institutional analysis is a comparative exercise: one compares the 
economic properties of alternative, feasible institutional and organizational forms; 
one does not compare the economic properties of organizations and institutions 
using an optimality measure, such as the Pareto one. A major point that emerges 
from our comparative exercise is that both proprietary and OSS organizations take 
advantage of the division of labor. But the division of labor benefits are not 
coextensive for the two organizations. The reason for this is that the two 
organizations rely on software licenses that engender different extents of the market. 
In our suggested thesis the market expands not just for what we may think of 
as physical reasons, say for “the operations of specialized undertakings which, taken 
together, constitute a new industry” (Young 1928, p. 539). The market also expands 
because of the emergence of specialized knowledge that concurrently defines – and 
coevolves with – physical market expansion (Rosenberg 1963; Bresnahan and 
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Gambardella 1998). The OSS community in fact represents a particularly clear 
example of a learning community where the emergent knowledge has significant 
productive value. In effect, the OSS community is mainly about the exchange, 
production, and reuse of one ‘service’: knowledge (Garzarelli 2004). 
Before proceeding, we wish to present our two primary motivations for 
relying on classical economic insights. Introducing our motivations will then also 
ease the more complete illustration of our implied analytical method. 
2. Motivations, Method, and Economic Growth 
A first motivation for which our Weltanshauung is classical is institutional. 
Institutions have repercussions. Institutions are an ensemble of rules that can create 
incentives to contribute to the creation of value (e.g., incentives to organize, to 
innovate, to bear risk), and in this way influence economy-wide division of labor 
arrangements (Foss and Garzarelli forthcoming). And different division of labor 
arrangements entail different increasing returns, which are a fundamental 
determinant of economic growth. Increasing returns, which generally emanate from 
increases in knowledge, in fact imply that output increases by a factor greater than 
the corresponding increase in input. For example, if there’s knowledge reuse – as is 
often the case in software code production (Haefliger et al. forthcoming) – output 
can, for example, be doubled without doubling an input (knowledge) (Langlois 
1999). 
This view that sees increasing returns and institutions as inseparable is central 
to Smithian thought, but enters contemporary economic theories of growth only in an 
ad hoc fashion. For instance, the endogenous theory of growth (e.g., Romer 1986; 
Lucas 1988) is not in contradiction with the view that increasing returns are 
fundamental for economic growth because they are generated from the growth of 
knowledge that leads to innovation. But there is an important difference. In the 
endogenous theory the growth of knowledge mainly emanates from private research 
and development investments. Since the causality of the theory has it that growth is a 
direct consequence of R&D it follows that phenomena that reduce R&D – such as 
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knowledge spillovers – are not desirable for they reduce social welfare. In our view, 
however, this is not the case, because knowledge growth is not unique to private 
R&D. The benefits of learning are social in the sense that they occur in the process of 
their emergence (Langlois and Robertson 1996).4
The substantive point is that if we consider a scenario where “there are no 
increasing returns to institutions and markets are competitive, institutions do not 
matter” (North 1990, p. 95). But institutions matter because it is their 
nonhomogenous nature that determines different division of labor arrangements. 
And it is different divisions of labor that can generate the unequal degrees of social 
learning that we interpret to be a crucial ingredient to understand different growth 
trajectories. In different terms, especially in an environment characterized by change, 
the type of institutional matrix determines the option set. For instance, if transaction 
costs are not negligible (one illustration of markets not being competitive), then the 
role of institutions is also not negligible, for institutions can also aid the calculation of 
the expected return on purposive human action, undertaken either individually or 
through organization, by economizing on transaction costs. Software licenses are the 
institutions of interest here, the fundamental rules of the organizational game. This 
brings us to our second, organizational motivation.5
Contemporary economic theories of growth – whether neoclassical (Solow 
1956; Swan 1956) or endogenous6 – do not consider production as a set of operations 
involving intricate knowledge combinatorics and learning. Rather, they consider the 
organization of inputs as simply the quantities in which the inputs are combined.7 
                                                 
4 Buchanan and Yoon (1999) attempt to reconcile the classical, especially Smithian, view of increasing returns with 
contemporary theories of growth that, especially for distributional reasons, assume constant (or decreasing) 
returns. Their argument is essentially a technological one: they suggest that it is possible for individual firms to 
have constant returns to scale production functions and simultaneously have (“generalized”) increasing returns 
throughout the economy. This is so because the constant returns need not be the same for each individual firm. 
Firms exhibiting different constant returns can define a sort of increasing returns frontier for the economy as a 
whole (see especially pp. 520-1). 
5 Our two motivations thus embed North’s (e.g., 1990, Ch. 1) distinction between institutions as rules of the game 
and organizations as players of the game. 
6 It can in fact be argued that the neoclassical growth theory and the endogenous one are not so different (Foss 
1998). 
7 Two elaborations of this claim are Winter (2006) and Garzarelli (forthcoming). 
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The neoclassical theory pictures knowledge as an anonymous means to increase 
output. The endogenous theory sees knowledge as an ordinary good purchased and 
sold in the market. Consequently, according to the endogenous theory, there is a 
separation between the producer of the final good and the producer of the 
knowledge needed for its production. Both theories differ from the Smithian one 
where the discoverer of new ways of production – the innovator – is the producer 
himself.8  
Moreover, if it is true, as just pointed out, that the endogenous theory tries to 
include innovation which the neoclassical one treats as exogenous, the endogenous 
still differs from the Smithian theory for trying to model innovation as a rational 
program. Innovation in Smith is often unplanned9, not consciously optimized. This is 
congruent with software production in general, given its complexity (Baetjer 1998). 
And it is congruent with OSS in specific, where innovation usually emerges thanks to 
the unpredictable interaction of multiple, often overlapping, inputs. 
Our implied analytical method to identify some economic costs and benefits of 
OSS and proprietary software production directly reflects the nature of our two 
motivations. This method – known as comparative institutional analysis10 – does not 
rest on the more familiar axiomatic optimization-cum-equilibrium economic 
framework, but on an economic framework that, as mentioned, evaluates feasible 
alternative organizational and institutional arrangements. The axiomatic framework 
judges the ‘efficiency’ properties of alternative arrangements in absolute terms: not 
according to their actual feasibility but according to an unreachable ideal (Arrow 
1962). For this reason it should not be too surprising that all feasible alternatives will 
                                                 
8 For example: all ‘‘the improvements in machinery … have by no means been the inventions of those who had 
occasion to use the machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the 
machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called 
philosophers or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do anything, but to observe every thing; and who, 
upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of the most distant and dissimilar objects. 
In the progress of society, philosophy or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole 
trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens’’ (Smith 1981[1776], I.i.9, p. 21). 
9 Innovation is also unplanned in most other theories that take technological change seriously, such as the 
Schumpeterian or neo-Schumpeterian (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1977; Dosi 1982; Langlois and Robertson 1986; 
Winter 2006). See also Avgerou (1998). 
 
5 
 
be flawed if compared to such an ideal. The task of comparative institutional analysis 
is on the other hand to understand which feasible alternative is relatively more 
promising.11 The comparison is not among ideal and feasible alternatives, but among 
feasible alternatives (e.g., firm, market, network, multinational, OSS organization, 
proprietary software organization) (e.g., Williamson 2005, pp. 11-4). As a result, 
“there is no guarantee whatsoever that” the “outcome is the most efficient one,” such 
as in, say, the case of a “Walrasian equilibrium or … a Nash equilibrium” (Aoki 2007, 
p. 10).12
The most common criterion to asses the relative ‘efficiency’ of the alternatives 
is a negative one: we usually assess the relative ability to internalize negative 
externalities, such as agency problems, corruption, pollution, rent seeking, resource 
over-use, shirking, and the like. Seldom do we think that different institutions and 
organizations exist and persist also – if not principally – to generate positive 
externalities, most notably rules of the game and division of labor arrangements for 
both production and exchange of goods, labor, physical and intellectual capital, 
services, etc. And that it is in the attempt to generate such positive externalities that 
negative ones may emerge, rather than the other way around (e.g., Garzarelli 2006).  
This article focuses on the positive criterion by looking at division of labor 
dynamics. This is not an unreasonable criterion because, as we shall see, in voluntary 
OSS production individuals self-select their input: individuals spontaneously align 
with the problems they are most inclined to solve anyway, leaving little room for 
unproductive behavior. At the same time, as we shall also see, this does not mean 
that voluntary production is flawless. 
                                                                                                                                                         
10 See, among an ever-growing literature, the recent Williamson (2005), Greif (2006), and Aoki (2007). 
11 As will become clearer below, this does not mean that comparative institutional analysis does not employ 
abstraction. 
12 This is not to say that comparative institutional analysis does completely away with any notion of equilibrium. 
Strictly speaking, the approach is a comparative static one between known alternatives. However, our position in 
the text is closer to the game-theoretic variant of the exercise. In this variant, the institutions to be compared can 
themselves be seen as alternative equilibrium systems under common knowledge – where for common 
knowledge we have in mind the (weaker) definition by Robert J. Aumann as concisely restated by Aoki (2007, pp. 
7-8): the “sufficient and necessary” condition “that every agent knows that a” certain “rule is true and that 
everybody else knows that it is true.” See also Greif (2006, pp. 55-152) and Foss and Garzarelli (forthcoming). 
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To be sure, the method of comparative institutional analysis gives up some of 
the formal elegance of the more familiar axiomatic framework. However, we believe 
– and we hope to show – that some loss of formal elegance, which is not tantamount 
to a loss of rigor, is more than justified in light of the lessons we derive. 
3. Licenses and Organizational Ideal Types 
When we think about software we usually think in terms of ‘programs,’ that is, 
applications (word processors, spreadsheets, browsers, mail-clients, databases, and 
so on) that we can run on our computer to get a variety of tasks done. And yet, it 
must be emphasized that in these cases we use programs only in their executable 
form. These programs interface with the computer in a machine language, something 
that the computer is able to read and process. Programs are in fact written in 
different computer programming languages (BASIC, C, Java, etc.) that are more 
readable to humans. When programs are in their human-readable form they are 
called source code. Other types of programs, called interpreters and compilers, are 
used to translate the source code into its executable form. When programs are in their 
executable form, all users can use their various functions. But the various functions 
that can be used are governed by different types of licenses. 
If a program is proprietary, the license agreement does not permit anyone to 
copy, distribute, or modify it. In addition, most of the times the source code is not 
even available for mere reading or studying. Free Software and OSS programs are 
instead governed by free software or open source licensing schemes. These licensing 
schemes specify that the source code is available, can be freely copied, modified, and 
distributed. Accordingly, the word “free” does not necessarily mean gratis, but the 
right to access, use and modify the source code. In fact, there are many companies 
that produce OSS for profit.  
For ease of discussion, we place Free Software and Open Source Software 
under a common rubric of Open Source. And the two software movements do to a 
large extent share similar rights. But there are differences. One difference is motive 
(Wheeler n.d.). The Free Software Foundation (FSF) emphasizes the possibility of 
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using and sharing software independently from the control of others. This objective 
is social. The Open Source Initiative (OSI) conversely emphasizes a technological 
objective. It is claimed that programs that fall within the Open Source definition are 
of higher ‘quality.’ This ‘efficiency’ motivation is used to stress the commercial 
viability of OSS. Yet, in the vast majority of cases, a license that meets the OSI’s open 
source definition also meets the FSF’s free software definition. In particular, the most 
common licenses are both Free and Open: GPL, Lesser GPL (LGPL), MIT/X and 
BSD-new (Wheeler 2005, 2007). Figure 1 displays different categories of software. 
Figure 1: Different Categories of Software 
 
Source: http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/categories.html
Different licensing schemes can lead to different organizational forms. The 
relationship between type of license and organizational form is not always direct or 
clear cut. The majority of organizational forms exhibit characteristics common to both 
proprietary and OSS licenses.13 Nevertheless, we can broadly distinguish two 
                                                 
13 Cf., e.g., Eunice (1998). 
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organizational ideal types14: cathedral production in the case of proprietary licenses, 
and bazaar production in the case of OSS licenses (Raymond 2001). In essence, the 
difference between the two ideal types is that one is a top-down, centralized 
organization, while the other is a bottom-up, decentralized organization where 
information is horizontally spread. We can more or less depict the two production 
ideal types as in Figure 2.15
For our purposes, the most important consequence deriving from such 
organizational distinction is that bazaar organization allows users to participate 
much more actively in the production process. Users usually tend to participate more 
because if they have a specific need they can directly tinker with the code in the 
attempt to satisfy such need, i.e., there is no intermediation. Raymond encapsulates 
this in terms of a first software programming lesson: “Every good work of software 
starts by scratching a developer’s personal itch” (Raymond 2001, p. 23, emphasis 
removed). The point to keep in mind is that if the code is modified, then it must be 
released back to the community. As such, the more active participation that is 
possible within bazaar OSS projects opens up a cycle of feedback processes, 
spreading information not just to the community of volunteers but also to the many 
other users who are not directly involved in the programming. In other words, the 
rules of the game of bazaar licensing schemes enable the production process to tap 
from a great variety of inputs – and thus benefit from extensive mistake-ridden 
learning16 – because they define an open organization of work. 
                                                 
14 Let us stress that we are working with ideal types in the Weberian sense and that as such we are abstracting. 
An ideal type is a heuristic expedient. It is constructed by considering some characteristics of a certain social role 
(e.g., the bureaucrat, the entrepreneur, the politician, the professor) or social phenomenon (e.g., the bureau, the 
firm, the parliament, the university) in order to aid social scientific research. By nature, it is not meant to consider 
all the characteristics of a role or phenomenon, but some recurring ones. The amount of characteristics an ideal 
type considers renders it more or less anonymous. In our case, for example, it can be assumed that the cathedral 
ideal type would – usually – use something like the waterfall model. In addition, as will be clarified below, the 
bazaar ideal type should not be considered as an organizational form where hierarchy or central direction are 
necessarily absent – Langlois and Garzarelli (2005) present a more formal elaboration of this. 
15 Thanks to Karim Lakhani for allowing us to use a variant of his picture. 
16 On mistake-ridden learning from a theoretical viewpoint, see especially Nelson and Winter (1977); for recent 
evidence that mistake-ridden learning can be an engine of success, see Anonymous (2007). 
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Figure 2: Cathedral versus Bazaar Production 
 
 
4. Two Divisions of Labor 
A crucial ingredient of intensive growth is, as Adam Smith pointed out long ago, the 
division of labor. When the subdivision of tasks is accompanied by market 
expansion, Smith added, there will be further growth. 
The classical division of labor view contains a lot of hidden information. 
Leijonhufvud (1986) elaborates on such view. Among other important insights, 
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Cathedral Development 
 
 
The code is developed by a 
software company 
 
? 
 
 
The code is locked via binary 
and sold to clients 
 
? 
 
 
 
The clients use programs 
? 
 
 
Community of 
volunteers 
develops code 
 
 
The code is 
distributed to 
users 
 
 
The users create 
the binary 
 
 
The users use 
program 
If problems arise, 
the users can fix 
them and if they 
desire they can 
even improve  the 
program 
 
The users 
distribute 
modifications 
back to 
volunteers 
Bazaar Development 
 
10 
 
Leijonhufvud points out that it is possible to identify two types of division of labor: 
one vertical, the other horizontal. 
Imagine five individuals, A, B, C, D, E, and five production tasks, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If 
the division of labor is such that each of the five individuals performs each of the five 
tasks sequentially (A1, A2, A3, …) we face a situation of vertical division of labor. 
Think, in general, of crafts production, where the artisan performs every single 
production task, often times right down to the selling, and the production processes 
of different artisans are not usually connected. Figure 3 illustrates. 
Figure 3: Vertical Division of Labor 
A1  A2  A3  A4  A5 
B1 B2  B3   B4  B5 ― Individual B working on  
  the entire production sequence 
C1 C2  C3 C4  C5 
D1 D2 D3 D4  D5 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 
Time 
Source: Leijonhufvud (1986, p. 208). 
When the market grows to such an extent that it allows each individual to 
perform only one task, the result is horizontal division of labor. In this case, each 
production task (our 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) becomes a trade in its own. Think, for example, of a 
shoemaker. Making shoes consists of a number of individual tasks (e.g., cutting the 
hide, stitching the sole, dying the leather black or brown). If the market grows, then 
these individual shoemaking tasks can develop into specialized ones. So, in terms of 
our notation, we would now have individual A doing only task 1, individual B doing 
only task 2, individual C doing only task 3, etc. Figure 4 depicts the horizontal 
division of labor. 
The two divisions of labor – “the core of [Smith’s] theory of production” – slip 
“through modern production theory as a ghostly technological change coefficient or 
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as an equally ill-understood economies-of-scale property of the function” 
(Leijonhufvud 1986, p. 209). But having identified the two divisions is not sufficient 
for our purposes. We now need to ask how they are comparable.17
Figure 4: Horizontal Division of Labor 
A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
  A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
    A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
      A1  B2  C3  D4  E5 
        A1  B2  C3  D4  E5  
          Etc.   …  
Time 
Source: Leijonhufvud (1986, p. 209). 
In the case of vertical division of labor we have that each individual is 
competent, if to different degrees, in a variety of production tasks. The shoemaker is 
competent in cutting the hide, stitching and dying the leather, making the shoe box 
for the final sale, and pricing and selling the shoes. There is little specialization at 
work. What is at work, rather, are both absolute and comparative advantages across 
the production sequence. This is why it is often commented that artisans are widely 
skilled or have a wide repertoire of competences in their trade, that their goods are 
unique, that they have the luxury of being able to work at their own pace, and that 
their goods are usually more appreciated because unique. Moreover, since the artisan 
is competent in a variety of tasks he is able to deal more effectively with change 
across the production sequence, i.e., able to adapt the entire chain of production to an 
innovation. 
But each individual production task, we noted, can become a trade of its own. 
As a result, in horizontal division of labor there is mostly comparative advantage at 
                                                 
17 Our answer to this question draws on Leijonhufvud (1986) and Langlois (1988). 
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work, and this has several benefits. “This great increase of the quantity of work 
which, in consequence of the division of labor, the same number of people are 
capable of performing, is owing to three different circumstances; first to the increase 
of dexterity in every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is 
commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and lastly, to the 
invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge labor, and 
enable one man to do the work of many” (Smith [1776]1981, I.i.5, p. 17). Thus 
specialization can be an important source of increasing returns, but, under the 
specific production mode highlighted below, so can be the lack of specialization. 
Notice, moreover, that these Smithian division of labor economies are not a 
free lunch. In horizontal division of labor there concurrently is a contraction of the 
skills of the individual: the competence repertoire of the individual narrows as task 
efficiency improves.18 Additionally, output is less unique and more standardized, 
and the innovation that may occur is less likely to involve more than one stage of 
production. This implies less ability to adapt to change that is not stage specific and 
to work at one’s own pace since production relies on several stages of production and 
individuals. 
5. Extent of the Market and Rules of the Game 
The amount of spinning off that turns vertical division of labor into horizontal 
division of labor primarily thanks to learning effects is bounded by the extent of the 
market. “As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor, 
                                                 
18 This is what the radical literature calls “deskilling” (Marglin 1974): unlike the Marxian view, ‘exploitation’ here 
does not derive from machinery but from increasing division of labor. That is, in this view a finer division of 
labor, not machinery, improves the ‘capitalist’s’ ability to extract surplus from the workers. This view, which 
originated in the debate about the ‘efficiency’ of the factory system, however does not consider other mechanisms 
that operate as the extent of the market grows. If we had only a mechanism in which tasks become simpler and 
more routine as the extent of the market grows, then such growth would reinforce “deskilling.” But if there are, as 
we try to suggest here, various kinds of confluence and branching of specialization where the growth of relevant 
knowledge also plays a significant role, then growth in the extent of the market may crowd humans into more 
skilled occupations. Compare Langlois (2003). See also Babbage (1835, Ch. 20), Rosenberg (1963, 1969), Ames and 
Rosenberg (1965), and Robertson and Alston (1992) for discussions that even machinery does not necessarily 
entail “deskilling.” 
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so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of that power, or, 
in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market is very small, no person 
can have any encouragement to dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for 
want of the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labor, 
which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other 
men’s labor as he has occasion for” (Smith [1776]1981, I.iii.1, p. 31). 
At the outset of the Wealth of Nations (I.iii, pp. 31-6) Smith writes that the extent 
of the market is often limited by three constraints: geographical (presence of natural 
barriers, such as hills, mountains, and sheer distance), physical (lack of appropriate 
infrastructure, such as roads), and technological (lack of appropriate means of 
transport, such as ships). Later, Smith considers the different ability of agricultural 
and manufacturing societies to cope with a limited extent of the market, and 
concludes that manufacture requires markets of a larger scale because of its more 
specialized nature. “Manufactures require a much more extensive market than the 
most important parts of the rude produce of the land. … Agriculture, therefore, can 
support itself under the discouragement of a confined market much better than 
manufactures” (Smith [1776]1981, IV.ix.45, p. 682). In the same context Smith 
highlights that there may be also another kind of constraint for market expansion: the 
ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the 
Gentoo religion [of Indostan] does not permit its followers to light a 
fire, nor consequently to dress any victuals upon the water, it in effect 
prohibits them from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and 
Indians must have depended almost altogether upon the navigation of 
other nations for the exportation of their surplus produce; and this 
dependency, as it must have confined the market, so it must have 
discouraged the increase of this surplus produce. It must have 
discouraged, too, the increase of the manufactured produce more than 
that of the rude produce (Smith [1776]1981, IV.ix.45, p. 682). 
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In brief, there may be social rules of the game that hold back the diffusion of division 
of labor.19 Or, as Greif (2006, p. 56) recently put it in a related context, by 
“determining who can exchange and what products can be exchanged, … institutions 
determine the scope and scale of the market.” 
Another way to capture this institutional observation, more in line with our 
main concerns, is as follows. If we think of the rules governing OSS and proprietary 
software we may then say that the OSS ones appear to be more abstract. That is to 
say that OSS licenses are rules that are more likely to be “applicable to an unknown 
and indeterminable number of persons and instances,” viz., that they “will have to be 
applied by the individuals in the light of their respective knowledge and purposes” 
(Hayek [1973]1982, p. 50). In many ways, this is equivalent to saying that the more 
abstract (or less specific) is an institution, the more likely it is to stimulate the growth 
of knowledge. 
Our reasoning about the costs and benefits of the two divisions of labor and 
about the extent of the market has hitherto been quite general. It is time to tentatively 
turn it into some considerations about software organization and economic growth. 
6. Cathedral, Bazaar, and Division of Labor 
What both cathedral and bazaar organization effectively try to do is attempt to tap 
into the inputs of different individuals. But there are some differences about how the 
two organizational ideal types do so. 
In the cathedral, individuals are hired on the basis of their implied 
specialization. A is hired because he is an expert in requirement analysis (task 1), B 
because he is an expert in specification (task 2), C because he is an expert in design 
and architecture (task 3), D because he is an expert in coding (task 4), etc. The 
organization of work relies on a hierarchy the top constituents of which try to define 
all the tasks before a project begins. There is a substantial degree of planning so that 
                                                 
19 A classic exploration of the institutional aspects of Smithian thought is Rosenberg (1960). 
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everyone is aware not only of the general organizational goal but also of his or her 
specific goal(s) before any task is begun. The idea is to plan something along the lines 
of Figure 4: a horizontal division of labor according to expertise in the attempt to 
simplify a set of complex tasks into smaller sets of less complex tasks in order to 
achieve a well-defined objective. 
The top-down approach to coding typical of the cathedral that attempts to 
minimize possible production problems ex post by trying to define objectives well ex 
ante is a classic one. And when the planning is done correctly it is indeed successful: 
there is no ambiguity in assigned task, deadlines are met, etc. Still, a shortcoming of 
the cathedral is usually identified. Since all parts of the project are planned in detail, 
all the teams working on the various parts of the project proceed at the same pace. 
This entails that it is impossible to begin coding and to check the functioning of the 
separate parts of the project until the entire project is finished (or almost so). The 
cathedral organization of work believes, however, that this is more than 
counterbalanced by the ability to adapt to change that impacts the entire production 
sequence. 
The open rules of bazaar production are instead based on the idea that there 
should be little conscious planning: the bazaar rests on the assumption that it is 
impossible to identify – and hence to hire – a set of individuals having the complete 
knowledge to efficiently solve all possible problems in every point in time. Being 
based on the assumption of human fallibility due to cognitive limitations20, the 
premise is to keep all input options open by not trying to hire the best input ex ante, 
but by letting individuals self-select their input as situations demand. Tasks are 
literally taken up by interested programmers as they emerge. Thus, bazaar division 
of labor takes advantage of effort in a spontaneous fashion (Langlois and Garzarelli 
2005). In this way, it is able to rely on a large – in effect, potentially unlimited – 
knowledge pool. While “coding remains an essentially solitary activity, the really 
great hacks come from harnessing the attention and brainpower of entire 
                                                 
20 The locus classicus of this argument is Hayek (1945). 
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communities. The developer who uses only his or her own brain in a closed project is 
going to fall behind the developer who knows how to create an open, evolutionary 
context in which feedback exploring the design space, code contributions, bug-
spotting, and other improvements come from hundreds (perhaps thousands) of 
people” (Raymond 2001, pp. 50-1). 
Notice that to tap from effort in a spontaneous way does not necessarily imply 
a horizontal division of labor in the traditional sense. There may be thousands of 
individuals each working in parallel on the same task. This means that, unlike the 
cathedral ideal type, it is possible to code and test early on. In fact, in the bazaar the 
details, e.g., the connections among various parts of the program, are left for last. 
This organization of work consequently exhibits the ability to adapt to change of a 
stage-specific type. 
But the fact that several individuals may be working on multiple tasks at once 
also more generally means that bazaar organization can simultaneously present both 
vertical and horizontal division of labor characteristics, implying that there is some 
redundancy at play. The redundancy is not a shortcoming, however. It engenders 
economies that have the ability to capitalize on multiple, intersecting knowledge 
combinatorics.21 These redundant economies from parallel, overlapping inputs 
encourage a production mode whereby being specialized in a particular task is not a 
condicio sine qua non to contribute: a contributor may still be a programmer in the 
formal sense or a final user with programming skills, but his input(s) may not always 
directly reflect his primary specialty. What matters is the spontaneity of the 
contribution, because the shared belief is that there’s potentially something to learn 
from everyone. In fact, as we noted, the central tenet of the bazaar is that the benefits 
of tapping from a virtually unlimited knowledge pool through a redundant division 
of labor outweigh all other costs, including coordination costs.  
                                                 
21 These redundant economies have similar effects to – even though they are not fully isomorphic to – what Garud 
and Kumaraswamy (1995, p. 96) christen economies of substitution, “which exist when the cost of designing a 
higher-performance system through the partial retention of existing components is lower than the cost of 
designing the system afresh.” 
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Redundant economies entail that – somewhat paradoxically – there can be 
increasing returns not just from specialized spontaneous inputs but also from 
nonspecialized spontaneous ones (in the sense just defined). This holds to the extent 
that the spillovers are nonrivalrous, namely, to the extent that the appropriation of 
the spillovers by one user does not affect the appropriation on behalf of other users 
(Garzarelli 2004). As already mentioned, this has empirical corroboration, for not all 
OSS bazaar projects are started from scratch, but often build on previous code 
(Haefliger et al. forthcoming): there is substantial knowledge reuse and sharing as 
well as knowledge discovery from experimentation without congesting 
appropriation. Redundant economies create value as long as individuals 
can plan the use of their resources free of interference from 
unpredictable external influences. This enables [planning and acting] 
despite the limited, local nature of most knowledge; it thus permits 
more effective use of divided knowledge, aiding the division of labor. 
The value of protected spheres and local knowledge has thus far been 
the sole motivation for giving software modules ‘property rights’ 
through encapsulation. … Encapsulation and communication of 
resources correspond to ownership and voluntary transfer, the basis of 
trade. … [M]otivated by the need for decentralized planning and 
division of labor, computer science has reinvented the notion of 
property rights.22
                                                 
22 Miller and Drexler (1988, webbed version). In his classic contribution, Alchian (1977[1965], p. 140, original 
emphasis) highlighted the following benefits of well-defined property rights: “(1) concentration of rewards and 
costs more directly on each person responsible for them, and (2) comparative advantage effects of specialized 
applications of (a) knowledge in control and (b) of risk bearing.” This argument is elaborated in Langlois and 
Garzarelli (2005) in the specific context of modularity and OSS organization; compare also Simon ([1962]1998, 
2002) on the notion of near-decomposability; Conway (1968) on the idea that output of production reflects the 
process of production; Sanchez and Mahoney (1996), which claims that product designs organization; and 
Raymond (2001, pp. 65-111) for a Lockean property right theory take on OSS.  
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Figure 5: Bazaar Division of Labor 
A1 A2 
B1 
C1  C3 ― Individual C working on multiple inputs 
D1 
   E3  E5 
F1 F2  F4 
  G2 G3 
  H2 
  I2 
   J3 
   K3  K5 
   L3 
   M3 
    N4 
O1   O4 O5 
    P4 
  Q2  Q4 
     R5 
     S5 
.   .   . 
.   .   . 
.   .   . 
 …   …   …  X9 ―  
 Individual X having exclusive rights on task 9, e.g., package maintenance 
  .  .   . 
  .  .   . 
  .  .   . 
 …    …    …  
Etc. 
Parallel, overlapping inputs 
In terms of our notation, in bazaar production we may have cases like A1, B1, 
C1, D1, F1, O1; A2, F2, G2, H2, I2, Q2; C3, E3, G3, J3, K3, L3, M3; etc. Figure 5 tries to 
give an idea of this redundant division of labor with both horizontal and vertical 
characteristics within an individual project. Let us further note that in bazaar projects 
it is not impossible to have one individual having (de jure) exclusive rights on a 
single package (a specific software component or set of software components). One 
concrete illustration of this is the case of the Package Maintainers of the Debian 
 
19 
 
Project. This is why X9 in Figure 5 is essentially an isolated case: no one else is 
working on task 9 because it is not allowed. Contemporaneously, this does not mean 
that other de facto isolated cases are necessarily absent in any point in time. We may 
easily have the case where only one individual is interested in working on one task. 
Before moving on, let us additionally qualify that we do not want to be read as 
claiming that the bazaar production mode is unique. Similar modes include the 
professions (Garzarelli 2004), “open science” (Dalle and David 2004), online open 
bibliographic databases, such as Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) (Krichel and 
Zimmermann 2005), and collaboration for literary and hobbyist ends (like the online 
encyclopedia Wikipedia and the photography site photo.net). 
Embedded in our discussion is the other side of the equation, too: the extent of 
the market. In our stylized illustration the rules of bazaar production place virtually 
no limit on the number of individuals working on a particular aspect of a software 
project. Even though not all individual inputs may ultimately end up in a program – 
that is, even if not all of the work in parallel is ultimately used in the particular 
software for which it is aimed (as, indeed, is often the case) – the extent of the market 
is still growing. The extent of the market is growing because mistake-ridden learning 
is nonetheless taking place.23 And it is learning that, as we saw, leads to some of the 
horizontal benefits that Smith was so keen on: improvements in individual skills and 
the ability to focus on a particular task, which would lead to the recognition of new 
organizational and technological opportunities.24 This would give rise, moreover, to 
new individuals participating in the production process and to the birth of new 
software projects that draw on the knowledge pool of other, preceding projects. 
Take note that the other benefit of horizontal division of labor – the reduction 
of idle time between tasks or reduction of “sauntering” (Smith [1776]1981, I.1.7, pp. 
18-9) – is really immaterial in the bazaar. Indeed, sauntering is actually a main raison 
                                                 
23 Let us qualify at this juncture that the mistake-ridden learning that can create market expansion may not only 
be caused by the bazaar. There is arguably a cross-fertilization effect in that often many programmers work on 
both cathedral (by day) and bazaar (by night) projects. Thanks to the anonymous referee for reminding us about 
this. 
 
20 
 
d’être of the bazaar: everyone is able to work at his or her pace like in the vertical 
division of labor. The reason why the reduction of sauntering is immaterial is due to 
what the cathedral considers inefficient: the economies from redundancy. Sauntering 
is offset by the redundant economies of the bazaar, that is, it is more than 
compensated by the benefits of networking in the first place. In “the open-source 
community organizational form and function match on many levels. The network is 
everything and everywhere: not just the Internet, but the people doing the work form 
a distributed, loosely coupled, peer-to-peer network that provides multiple 
redundancy and degrades very gracefully. In both networks,” i.e., the Internet and 
the bazaar, “each node is important only to the extent that other nodes want to 
cooperate with it” (Raymond 2001, p. 224, note 10). 
This is not to say that problems arising from sauntering would be completely 
absent. As a bazaar projects grows, so does the possibility that individuals lose track 
of priorities. In large projects (e.g., Debian) package maintainers usually have, as was 
said earlier, complete authority over their part of the project. But because they are 
volunteers, it is not uncommon for them to lose interest or become busy with 
something else that is not, e.g., a top priority. If they stop maintaining their package – 
one possible nonroutine pattern of behavior that could also lead to lock-in25 – the 
quality of the overall project may suffer over time. It is in these cases that the 
hierarchy more typical of the cathedral manifests itself: the leader of the project 
intervenes. A bazaar project leader is at the top of the organizational hierarchy. 
Traditionally, a leader has authority to grant some rights to developers and is 
expected to intervene in times of “urgent action.” It would seem that in actual fact the 
most fundamental role that he or she plays is one that has mostly to do with 
proactive and suggestive action; a leader is in essence expected to coordinate rather 
                                                                                                                                                         
24 Compare Rosenberg (1969), Nelson and Winter (1977), and Dosi (1982). 
25 Following David (1985), by lock-in (or path dependency) economists have in mind the notion that a certain 
institution, organization or technology gets stuck in a particular trajectory that, with ex post wisdom, may not 
seem the most appropriate one. That is, the notion is that a particular standard may reveal itself to be ‘inefficient’. 
David’s controversial (cf. Liebowitz and Margolis 1990) example is the QWERTY keyboard, claimed to be inferior 
to the (nonstandard) one of Dvorak. A switching out of such ‘lock-in’ is very unlikely because it would involve a 
fixed cost for many individuals. So the proposal is that, if caught in time, that is, before it becomes a standard, a 
particular lock-in can be ‘cured’ by fiat. 
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than to direct production.26 This is so because the leadership role itself is a fruit of 
openness. As Linus Torvalds, creator and principal software architect of Linux, says: 
it 
just happened by a kind of natural selection. I’d been doing Linux as 
my own personal project, and I put it out just because I wanted 
comments and because I thought that somebody else was interested, 
and obviously, partly because I thought it was a really interesting 
project and it’s a way of just showing off … there were a lot of things 
that people asked for and also implemented themselves. They started 
out just asking for small things and then asking for larger things or 
doing them themselves, and none of this was very planned for. The 
leadership part came by default, because nobody wants to make 
decisions, right? Things just happened, and it wasn’t really planned. 
And I was the obvious person for it.27
7. Conclusions 
The division of labor relationships at interest here are not so straightforward. They 
are, rather, redundant, combining vertical and horizontal characteristics: everyone is 
typically specialized in the realization of one task that he or she volunteers input for, 
but, thanks to open organizational rules, this specialization does not prevent 
individuals from trying to contribute to other tasks where task matching may be 
weaker. This results in a simultaneous increase in the productivity of all tasks, 
because total output increases at a rate superior to the increase in the number of 
programmers (or hardware). 
                                                 
26 See, e.g., http://www.debian.org/devel/leader.en.html
27 March 17, 2000, http://www.taborcommunications.com/archives/17276.html
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In addition to productivity gains of the more traditional sort, bazaar OSS 
production can foster growth in the extent of the market through the faster 
appropriability of the benefits from innovation. One of the distinguishing marks of 
OSS, we noted, is that its users have the freedom not only to study its code but also to 
modify it. In other words, the production process is open not just to the programmer 
in the more formal sense, but to the final user as well. If a final user has some 
programming skills, he can try to satisfy a particular software need by directly 
accessing the code. Hence, if the final user successfully modifies a program, this 
modification is in turn accessible to others. And even if a final user does not have 
sufficient programming skills to satisfy a particular need, he can in principle improve 
them thanks to the freedom of access to the code. Productivity improves even if not 
all inputs are ultimately accepted for a project, for there are still benefits from 
concomitant volunteer code submission (e.g., improvement of skill, knowledge 
diffusion, reuse of code, trial and error learning). One substantive implication is that 
the speed at which innovations become available to users is faster than under a 
proprietary software regime, which implies even more innovations – and therefore 
more growth. 
The ability of bazaar organization to create value is not only restricted to the 
gains of productivity and to diffused innovation within a single bazaar project or 
within the more general OSS community. Bazaar OSS can play a crucial role at a 
larger level too. It can contribute to narrowing the technological gap between 
developing and developed countries, and therefore decreasing the so-called 
dependency of developing countries on foreign technology. Additionally, OSS 
presents an opportunity for developing countries to customize technology by 
allowing individuals to adapt the existing technology to their specific needs and 
conditions, which are not necessarily the same as those in developed countries.28
Similarly, by allowing developing countries to participate in technology 
development, OSS becomes a crucial factor for these countries to develop their own 
                                                 
28 Compare, for example, Arora et al. (1997, p. 133). 
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industries (including for profit OSS firms). We must not forget, in fact, that it is 
possible for production processes to split. The output of one process can become the 
input for another, and so on. An economy experiencing growth will present 
increasing division of labor not just within organizations and sectors, but also among 
organizations and sectors.29 If history is anything to go by, an economy that is self-
sustaining in the long term is one that experiences industrialization and learning 
concurrently.30
Yet, this article does not wish to claim a mechanical relationship between 
software and growth as is sometimes done in the case of hardware.31 The article’s 
approach is more microanalytic. By comparing the costs and benefits of proprietary 
and OSS organization of work – the cathedral and the bazaar organizational ideal 
types – it has argued that, other things equal, the bazaar is more promising for 
growth because of the possibility to spontaneously participate to a software project.32 
In short, our supply-side perspective leads us to conjecture that the bazaar has a 
value-stimulating edge because, thanks to its licenses, the costs of drawing on both 
vertical and horizontal division of labor are more than counterbalanced by the 
benefits, which include growth in the extent of the market. 
At the same time, however, we do not want to be considered as contemporary 
reincarnations of Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss. OSS and bazaar organization are not the 
best of all possible worlds. As with most other technologies whose purposes go 
beyond their original scope – think of computers, machine tools, railroads, 
semiconductors, the steam engine, transistors, etc.33 – a minimum of literacy, 
competence and infrastructure is required. 
                                                 
29 For example, Young (1928), Leijonhufvud (1986), and Langlois (1988). 
30 E.g., Rosenberg (1963). 
31 For notable exceptions, see, for example Ames and Rosenberg (1965), Robertson and Alston (1992), and 
Avgerou (1998). 
32 Admittedly, a great part of our “other things equal” has to do with exploring the bazaar more than the 
cathedral, that is, with keeping the cathedral more an (anonymous) ideal type than the bazaar. 
33 In economics, these are known as general-purpose technologies – see, for example, Bresnahan and Gambardella 
(1998), and Rosenberg’s (1963) earlier notion of “technological convergence”; see also Stigler (1951). 
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If the freedom of OSS licenses is more fully understood and tapped into, we 
would perhaps in part accomplish what growth and development policies have 
always searched for: ways of transferring relevant productive knowledge and of 
creating sustainable growth through the generation of more productive knowledge. 
There is more to OSS than the fact that some OSS programs are available gratis. OSS 
is above all a system of rules that aids the spontaneous “release of energy.”34
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